No manufactured threats
A proposal must not reward newly escalated harm, coercive leverage, extortion, harassment, or a worse baseline created to extract concessions.
Safety
Moral Trade should make serious cooperation easier without rewarding coercion, exposing private moral preferences, weakening evidence standards, or ignoring harms to people outside the deal.
Core rules
A proposal must not reward newly escalated harm, coercive leverage, extortion, harassment, or a worse baseline created to extract concessions.
Exact wishes, identities, sensitive constraints, evidence bodies, and contact details remain private until the relevant person approves a scoped disclosure.
Private matching does not scrape private feeds, mass-message candidates, or contact a possible counterparty without an accountable human request and review.
A deal can be mutually preferred by its direct parties and still require externality review, affected-party standing, correction, or rejection.
A receipt or log may show that an action occurred. It does not automatically prove the no-trade baseline, causation, impact, or absence of externalities.
Participants and affected parties can challenge evidence, request correction, appeal decisions, report incidents, revoke grants, or freeze private matching state.
Blocked or escalated
Public contracts
Machine-readable endpoints expose security, operations, disclosure, appeal, incident, and externality rules. Public copy should remain tied to those checks.
Open the current public contract and validator result.
Open JSONOpen the current public contract and validator result.
Open JSONOpen the current public contract and validator result.
Open JSONOpen the current public contract and validator result.
Open JSONOpen the current public contract and validator result.
Open JSONOpen the current public contract and validator result.
Open JSONScale gates
Do not expand sensitive admin access until MFA, device/session review, key rotation, and incident-response evidence are ready.
Requires two factor admin gate, device session review gate, key rotation gate, incident response reporting.
Do not expand paid-action volume until provider/security boundaries, key rotation, incident response, and abuse throttles are documented.
Requires platform abuse throttling, provider encryption at rest, server only secret management, key rotation gate, incident response reporting.
Do not expand public trust badges unless private cache, authenticated session, abuse throttling, and incident reporting remain verifiable.
Requires private no store cache, supabase auth cookies, contact disclosure mfa step up, platform abuse throttling, incident response reporting.
Non-claims